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John Wilkins and Malte Ebach respond to the dismissal of classification as
something we need not concern ourselves with because it is, as Ernest Rutherford
suggested, mere ‘‘stamp collecting.’’ They contend that classification is neither
derivative of explanation or of hypothesis-making but is necessarily prior and
prerequisite to it. Classification comes first and causal explanations are dependent
upon it. As such it is an important (but neglected) area of philosophical study.
Wilkins and Ebach reject Norwood Russell Hanson’s thesis that classification relies
on observation that is theory-laden and deny the need for aetiological assumptions
and historical reconstruction to justify its arrangement. What they offer instead is a
significant (albeit controversial) contribution to the philosophical literature on
classification, a pre-theoretic natural classification based on the observation of
patterns in data of ready-made phenomena.
Their notion of ready-made phenomena rests on a conception of tacit knowledge
or know-how. This is evident in their distinction between strong Theory-dependence
and naı¨ve theory-dependence. Their small t-theory-dependence permits patterns of
observation that facilitate know-how but does not rely on a domain-specific
explanatory theory of their aetiology. Wilkins and Ebach suggest classification
differs from theory building in that it is passive (whereas theory building is active).
Classification is possible just because it does not require the sieve of theory to
capture classes that are ‘‘handed to you by your cognitive dispositions and the data
that you observe’’ (p. 18). Finding regularities sans-theory is just something we do
and can do without any prior theory about the underlying causes or origins of the
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resultant regularities. Luke Howard’s classification of clouds serves as an exemplar
of a passive, theory-free classification system and the periodic table and the DSM
help to illustrate this type of non-aetiological patterning.
A recurrent theme is the nature of naturalness. For Wilkins and Ebach, the
conception of naturalness is not one that is based on the generation or discovery of
natural kind categories popular in both the traditional metaphysics of Mill and
Wittgenstein as well as updated notions within philosophy of biology such as
Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster kinds. Instead, Wilkins and Ebach define the
naturalness of classification as the falling into hierarchical patterns, aligning the
search for natural arrangement with the aim of systematics, and as something that is
grounded in a cognitive task or activity. However, they leave the question of realism
v. antirealism open. ‘‘In natural classification…we must have real relations no
matter how we might interpret ‘real’’’ (p. 70). There is tension with regard to their
ontological commitments as they vacillate between constructive, operationalist, and
realist approaches. Wilkins and Ebach initially define real as that which is causal
and important (pp. 70–71), and later as that which ‘‘depends in no way upon a mind
or observer’’ (p. 122). This makes their claim that there was ‘‘no real theory
involved [in the pre-Darwinian classifications of Jussieu and Adanson]’’ (p. 64)
difficult to interpret.
Early chapters provide the historical background and philosophical motivation
necessary for the main project—to introduce a theory neutral classification system they
name ‘Radistics’. Radistics is not grounded on any particular discipline or theory. Its
purpose is to represent classification qua classification as a general cognitive enterprise
applicable to fields frompedology to psychiatry.Wilkins andEbach’s formulation relies
on the tools of biological systematics as a guide, rather than an essentialist notion of
natural kinds, prototypes, exemplars (Hacking), theories of meaning (Putnam), or
family resemblances (Wittgenstein). Extricating pattern from the process of evolution
and phylogenetic reconstruction, Wilkins and Ebach’s Radistics can be best described
as generalized cladistics, one clearly influenced by Gareth Nelson’s pattern cladism. In
the activity of classifying, new specimens are treated as type specimens (like ersatz
holotypes) and the patterns are the relationships that are observed between those and
other previously observed specimens. Some specimen is declared to be of a different
type because it doesn’t fit the patterns we made using previous type specimen
classifications. It needs to be put into a different type, and so belongs to a different taxon.
Doing so relies on a pattern of three specimens (or more generally ‘units’), two ofwhich
relatemore closelywith eachother than they dowith the third. It is a three-unit statement
of relatedness. In cladistics, a natural pattern is one that is monophyletic. Monophyly is
redefined within the neutral terminology of Radistics as ‘Formism’, referring to ‘‘the
relationship between two or more manifestations of the same formae’’ (p. 148).
Formism is intended to be a term that captures both transformational and taxic
conceptions of monophyly currently in use within biology (e.g. stem group, a single
branch of a phylogenetic tree, all and only descendants of the most recent common
ancestor), but can also serve as a litmus test for what qualifies as natural classification
outside of biology.
Wilkins and Ebach’s pattern cladist-inspired approach clearly aims to be
objective and empirical, rather than subjective and theory-laden. They conceive of
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classification as the radogramization of the world, washed of the messy business of
phylogenetic theorizing that sullies our access to it. To Theodosius Dobzhansky’s
famous 1973 essay entitled, ‘‘Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light
of Evolution’’, Wilkins and Ebach’s The Nature of Classification is a retort—that
something can—and that something is classification. The light of theory is not
necessary to understand the role of natural classification. Their excision of historical
reconstruction, evolution, development, and other aetiological processes from the
patterns they produce is, (like the pattern cladism that inspires it), controversial.
Wilkins and Ebach are well aware of this and address worries that doing so opens
the door to creationism and typology (p. 150). Although those opposed to pattern
cladism may be unconvinced by Wilkins and Ebach’s generalized schema of
Radistics, their constructive contribution to the historical and philosophical
discussion of classification will undoubtedly motivate new critical discussion of
an area that has been neglected. Wilkins and Ebach present an ambitious but well-
motivated discussion for a theory-free classification which, if successful, would
circumvent the problematic ladenness of observation. As such, The Nature of
Classification succeeds in extending discussion of philosophy of classification
beyond that of biological systematics and in forging a neutral terminology with
which to do so.
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